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Abstract: Reputation supports pro-social behaviors in a variety of social settings and across different
ages. When re-encounters are possible, developing a positive reputation can be a valuable asset that
will result in better outcomes. However, in real life, cooperative acts are ambiguous and happen in
noisy environments in which individuals can have multiple goals, visibility is reduced, and reputation
systems may differ. This study examined how reputation within a virtual environment affects fairness
in material allocations and trust in information exchange, in a three-actors interaction game in which
each player had an incentive to deceive the others. We compared the results of two experimental
conditions, one in which informers could be evaluated, and one without reputational opportunities.
A reputational system appeared to enhance both trust and fairness even within a virtual environment
under anonymous condition. We tested adolescents and adults finding that they were consistently
more generous when visibility was increased, but they showed significantly different patterns in
resources allocation and information exchange. Male and female participants, across ages, showed
other interesting differences. These findings suggest that reputational effects increase fairness and
trust even in a noisy, ambiguous and uncertain environment, but this effect is modulated by age
and gender.
Keywords: reputation; fairness; trust; virtual environment; social cognition
1. Highlights
• The introduction of a “Reputational System” promotes fairness during a web-based multiplayer
social dilemma game.
• The reputation of an agent within the real environment of our experiment, appears to affect its
“Social Influence” (i.e., the tendency of an interacting receiver of accept its suggestion) on the
others, disregarding the real usefulness of its advices.
• A positive reputation of the interactor within our virtual environment is associated to a more
coherent behaviour of the subject.
• According to age people presented different behavioral patterns about reputation management.
• Men and women were affected in different ways by reputational concerns.
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2. Introduction
Fairness, trust and social influence dynamics have received an increasing attention in relation
to virtual environments in latest years. In fact, these constructs appear to play a fundamental role
in a plethora of virtual social interactions, e.g., e-market, virtual workgroups, crowdsourcing [1,2].
In virtual environments “reputational systems" have been widely used because of their capability to
positively impact the aforementioned psychosocial dynamics. Nevertheless, a model explaining the
potential impact of such systems in affecting online human dynamics, for instance within a social
dilemma situation (i.e., where individuals have conflicting interests), is still missing.
Our study shows that in a virtual environment the introduction of a reputational system,
structured to be independent and not affecting the goal given to the subjects, has a significant impact
on the decision dynamics (i.e., the problem solving strategies) adopted by the players. In particular,
when the reputational system was present we observed an increasing in the fairness and trust
levels, as well as in the players’ average social influence on the others. We also found age-related
differences in reputation usage (i.e., adolescents avoided asking information to bad and ambiguous
reputed individuals), and management (i.e., adolescents obtained a lower level of reputation overall),
while gender effects appeared quite small.
Reputation Effects on Prosocial Behaviors between Real and Virtual Environment
Fairness and trust are two important aspects of social interactions. A concern for relative payoffs
between oneself and another individual, and the willingness to rely on someone’s help or suggestion
are important aspects of social exchanges [3,4]. Understanding why and how humans act pro-socially
is a challenging question, and several mechanisms have been proposed among which reputation has
gained important recognition in the last decade [5–8]. Computational models [9,10], and laboratory
experiments [11–13], emphasize the role of reputation as a motive supporting pro-social behaviours
through indirect reciprocity [14]. Indeed, reputation allows to discriminate between pro-social and
selfish individuals through informal and inexpensive social control [15–17], and thanks to gossip
cheaters can be identified, and their selfish choices punished [18]. Interestingly, reputation still
influences people’s decision making even when it comes from a complete unknown source and
it is earned from an obscure situation [19]. Analogously, in online markets information sharing is
a powerful means to build trust and enforce norms [20], and reputation systems based on online
feedback mechanisms [21] make possible to have large scale interactions between complete strangers
living in faraway places. Moreover, the information and communication technologies (ICT) revolution
introduced brand new factors affecting trust and reputation dynamics impacting on both cyber
communities as well as real ones [22–25]. In particular, very recent research highlights how a transaction
could be completed in virtual environments because of reputation, even in the absence of any other
enforcement [26].
Reputation can be considered as a collective phenomenon and a product of social processes [27],
that goes well beyond single beliefs of impressions in the mind of any single individual. We can think
of reputation as a product of natural evolution that equips human groups with a higher collective
intelligence potential. In such sense, reputation is an evolutionarily stable strategy [17] that fosters
the emergence and maintenance of pro-social behaviours. Not surprisingly, humans learn very early
how to handle reputation during their development. The progressive achievement of a complete
Theory of Mind [28,29], and the maturation of the reward system [30] might provide the bases for the
development of a capacity to track others’ reputation and to manage one’s own. During ontogeny
reputation management develops and people learn to use reputation in a more structured and strategic
way [31]. For instance, adolescents unlike adults show high levels of trust but low reciprocity [32].
Moreover, reputation is a mechanism that acts on a pre-existing social structure characterized by roles
and status. For this reason, men and women, could be influenced differently by reputation [33,34].
Previous literature about human interactions in virtual environment highlighted even how anonymity,
physical isolation, low identifiability and group salience could affect social influence dynamics [35,36].
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The interaction between these factors could lead to different outcomes, among which, when the social
identity is salient, a greater adherence to local norms. Reputation represents a proxy for local norms [37].
Therefore, according to the Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects, anonymous individuals
could be influenced more by reputation if the reference group’s importance is stressed. Under these
circumstances reputation’s social influence should appear to foster more pro-social behaviours in
virtual environment.
In the present work, we tested whether the introduction of a reputation system increased fairness
in resource allocation, and whether there was an effect on trustworthiness and trust dynamics during
the process of information provision, within adolescents and young adults. We developed a novel
experimental paradigm, modifying a previous experiment by Feinberg et al. [38], in which reputation
was implemented as the opportunity to like or dislike an Observer who could provide Receivers with
suggestions about a deal proposed by a Donor. Receivers had only partial information about the deal
(i.e., they knew the offer amount without be acknowledged about the requested amount), therefore
a truthful suggestion from the Observer could help them make a more accurate/safety decision.
An important detail of the game was that Observers do not get any direct or indirect benefits from
providing wrong or right suggestions, even when they did not acknowledge the Receivers identity.
In the experimental condition, we introduced the opportunity for Receivers to punish Observers by
giving them bad evaluations as well as to reward them with positive feedbacks. Both the presence of
a reputational mechanism within the game/setting, as well as the reputation level of the Observes
should enhance the fairness and the trust within an anonymous virtual/cyber community.
Overall, the following are the main hypotheses tested in the present study:
Hypothesis 1. The introduction of a “Reputational System” affects Donors’ pro-social behaviour (i.e., fairness)
in our web-based multiplayer social dilemma game.
Hypothesis 2. A positive reputation have a greater social influence upon the others than the other types of
reputational status (i.e., negative, ambiguous) exerting more frequently trust-related behaviours (i.e., suggestion
request, suggestion following).
Hypothesis 3. The age of the participants elicits different behavioural patterns about reputation management
and usage.
Hypothesis 4. Men and women differ in reputation management skills.
3. Experiment
3.1. Sampling
The research was conducted in accordance with the guidelines for the ethical treatment of human
participants of the Italian Psychological Association (AIP). The participants were recruited with the
snowball sampling strategy. All participants signed an informed consent and could withdraw from
participation at any time.
The participants were 226 (108 female). All participants were volunteers and their anonymity
was preserved through the use of nicknames during the game. All the participants completed the
experiment. At the end of each experiment a debriefing session took place to give participants more
information about the aims of the study, clarify their doubts and to identify participants who were
able to guess the research hypothesis. Since none of the participants succeeded to identify the aims of
the experiments, none of them has been excluded from the subsequent analysis.
3.2. Study 1
Participants (N = 154, 70 women; M = 15.7 years, SD = 1.3) recruited in a high school in the city
of Prato (Italy) completed the study on a voluntarily basis with no monetary incentives. The testing
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sessions were conducted in the computer lab inside the school. Instructions were read aloud by the
experimenter and also shown on the participants’ screens. Participants played in groups of six and
each session lasted a maximum of 30 min.
3.3. Study 2
Participants (N = 72, 38 women; M = 22 years, SD = 3.7) recruited from the University of Florence
completed the testing sessions in the computer lab of the Faculty of Psychology. Not differently from
the study 1 participants, the subjects of the second study did not have monetary incentives. Instructions
were read aloud by the experimenter and also shown on the participants’ screens. Participants played
in groups of six and each session lasted a maximum of 30 min.
The subjects’ distribution across the two conditions is reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Number of participants in each condition divided according their sample type.
Experimental Design
Reputation Treatment Control Condition
Adolescents Adults Adolescents Adults
Number of participants 78 36 78 36
4. Materials and Methods
All measures and manipulations of the studies are disclosed in the following section.
The Bargaining Game
The game consisted of 45 independent rounds, in which a Donor interacted with a Receiver and
an Observer. Participants were anonymous and identified through nicknames. Participants played in
groups of six, and each participant played all the roles of the game for fifteen times in a certain sequence
determined by a computer program. The initial role for all the player was random. However, to
minimize and standardize the influence of the tasks order upon players’ problem solving we balanced
the turn shifting (i.e., the same kind of action occurred after three turns). Overall, each participant
interacted three times with every other group member in each role. We selected three matches to
guarantee that two participants in each role could interact more than once, while maintaining the
duration of the game sessions within 30 min. At the beginning of the game, each player was endowed
with three kinds of resources, labelled Gold, Power, and Happiness, which were functionally equivalent.
Among these resources, one was set equal to 50 units and the other two were set at a minimal level
of 5 units each. According to this rule, resources were randomly distributed by the software at the
beginning of the session, and the player with the highest amount of the minimum resource at the
end of the game was the winner. So, if Player A had at the end of the 45 rounds 25 Gold, 13 Power
and 17 Happiness and Player B had 10 Gold, 30 Power and 25 Happiness, Player A score will be
represented by his amount of Power while for Player B the score will be calculated upon his quantity
of Gold.
The players could see both their score and those of their opponents for the whole duration of the
game. To prevent any influence upon participants’ decision making resulting from the previous turns
memories with a certain individual, players were not aware of which player they were interacting.
In the game screens, the nicknames of the other players were omitted apart from the general
ranking board. Thus, for instance, the Player A interacted with the Player B without knowing anything
about him except his role. The only additional information about another player (i.e., the Observer)
was constituted by his reputation in the Reputation Treatment condition. Not further information
in both condition was permitted. We specify that once the players were appointed to one condition
(i.e., Reputation Treatment or Control Condition) no shifting was allowed. Therefore, the players in the
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Reputation Treatment had always at their disposal the Observers’ reputation, while the individuals in
the Control condition never experienced this additional information.
Furthermore, to avoid any sort of “end game” effect participants in all conditions were unaware
of the game session duration (i.e., number of rounds).
The players in each role had different tasks and goals (see Table 2).
Table 2. Summary of the actions played in the two conditions.
Reputation
Roles ON OFF
Donor Offers her maximum resource Offers her maximum resourceand asks the Receiver her minimum resource and asks the Receiver her minimum resource
Observer
Has the opportunity to make a Has the opportunity to make a
suggestion (accept or to decline) suggestion (accept or to decline)
about the Donor’s offer and can about the Donor’s offer
receive a like or a dislike from the Receiver
Receiver
Accepts or declines the Donor’s Accepts or declines the Donor’s
deal with no additional information deal with no additional information
or asks for the Observer suggestion. or asks for the Observer suggestion.
Once the deal is completed
the Receiver can rank the Observer’s
suggestion with a like or a dislike.
The Donor’s task was to make an offer and a request to the Receiver. The Donor offers some
amount of her greatest resource, among the three at her disposal, and asks in return some amount of her
minimum resource to the receiver. Actual quantities were adjusted by means of sliders. The Receiver
could only see the amount and type of the resource offered by the Donor, but was unaware of what and
how much the Donor had asked in return. The Receiver could “accept” or “reject” the donor’s deal
right away, or could require the Observer’s suggestion (by clicking on the "ask suggestion" button).
The Observer had the opportunity to evaluate the Donor’s offer and request, knowing both the amount
and the type of resources involved in the deal. In accordance with that information, the Observer
could provide a hint to the Receiver, clicking on the button “suggest to accept”, “no hint” or “suggest
to refuse”. The Observer had 10 s to make her choice. When the reputation system was active (in the
so-called Reputation Treatment), the Receiver had access to the rating (i.e., the number of like and
dislike accumulated) of the Observer. Once the offer is accepted or rejected, the Receiver becomes
aware of the Donor request (i.e., deal information was shown on the player’s screen). If the Receiver
accepted the deal than the resources were transferred otherwise were not. In the Reputation Treatment,
if the Receiver had asked for the suggestion, she had the opportunity to give a like or a dislike to the
Observer. Observers were not aware of the single evaluations received, nor of their overall reputation.
The receiver had 18 s to make her decisions. More time was given to the Receivers as they could
potentially perform more actions than the other roles (i.e., ask for a suggestion, decide on the deal,
feedback Observers). For all the roles, if a decision was not made within the available time frame,
default options were set by the computer.
The bargaining game was developed as a multiplayer virtual game implemented through Google
Apps, using the Google Script programming language.
For clarity reasons, we combine the presentation of the results of the two studies.
5. Results
5.1. Data Analysis
The preconditions necessary to inferential analyses were verified on the data produced by
the experiments. For all the continuous variables that were under investigation, the normality of
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the distribution was assessed through the analysis of asymmetry and kurtosis values. When the
distribution was not quasi Gaussian (i.e., skewness and kurtosis ranging between −1 and +1),
a logarithmic transformation was applied. On continuous variables that do not respect the
preconditions a discretization were made, using the median as a reference, and thus defining two levels
for each variable. Because of the repeated measures structure of the experimental data, the inferential
analyses were conducted using a general linear mixed model (GLMM) approach [39]. The difference
in sample size has always been offset by either the type of data analysis or by random resampling
through bootstrap method.
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3 the descriptive statistics for both studies are presented, and they are visualized according
to gender. The upper part of the table presents those variables that have been measured in both
condition (i.e., Reputation Treatment and Control Condition), while the bottom part reports those that
have been recorded in the Reputation Treatment.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of all the game variables.
Study 1 Study 2
Female Male Female Male
Average (s.d.) Average (s.d) Average (s.d) Average (s.d)
Amount offered 4.02 (2.0) 4.83 (2.1) 5.12 (2.2) 5.12 (2.2)
Amount requested 6.26 (4.1) 6.80 (3.9) 4.77 (1.7) 5.68 (3.6)
Diff. offered-requested −2.3 (8.60) −1.86 (9.11) −0.04 (5.09) −0.58 (7.56)
Suggestion (−1, 0, +1) 0.19 (0.84) 0.00 (0.88) 0.23 (0.88) −0.15 (0.90)
Suggestion required (0, 1) 0.41 (0.49) 0.53 (0.40) 0.58 (0.49) 0.64 (0.48)
Acceptance (−1, 0, +1) 0.15 (0.94) 0.02 (0.94) 0.03 (0.98) −0.27 (0.92)
Suggestion coherence (−1, +1) 0.19 (0.71) 0.23 (0.85) 0.27 (0.86) 0.27 (0.86)
Score 10.45 (8.39) 10.5 (3.62) 11.52 (7.16) 13.52 (8.80)
Variables related to the activation of the reputation system (Rep. On)
Final reputation −1.06 (2.55) −0.56 (2.53) 2.54 (6.49) 1.86 (6.10)
Dislike/Like (−1, 0, +1) 10.7%/10.5% 15.7%/12.2% 9.7%/16.2% 18.5%/22.2%
Mean Like received 2.05 (1.0) 2.17 (1.3) 3.59 (1.8) 4.59 (2.9)
Mean Dislike riceived 2.29 (1.4) 2.27 (1.4) 2.11 (1.2) 3.62 (2.1)
Suggestion request coherence 46.5% (+) 41.5% (+) 46.8% (+) 57.7% (+)
Acceptance coherence 44.4% (+) 42.9% (+) 54.7% (+) 49.2% (+)
Feedback coherence 10.9% (+) 13.4% (+) 15.1% (+) 22.2% (+)
Amount offered: Quantity of the resource offered; Amount requested: Quantity of the resource requested;
Diff. offered-requested: difference between the amount offered and requested in return by the Donors;
Suggestion: to refuse (−1), no suggestion provided (0), to accept (1); Suggestion required: the Receiver did
not request the Observer’s suggestion (0), the Receiver benefited of the Observer’s advice (1); Acceptance:
The Receiver accepted the deal (1), refused the deal (−1) or did not take any action within the time limit (0);
Suggestion coherence: The Observer provided a “good” suggestion (1) (i.e., suggested to accept a deal when
the variable “Diff. offered-requested” is major or equal to 0, and to refuse a deal when “Diff. offered-requested” is
smaller than 0), or a “bad” suggestion (−1); Score: The quantity of the minimum resource for each player;
Final reputation: Difference between the number of the positive feedbacks (i.e., like) and the negative ones
(i.e., dislikes); Dislike/Like: The Receiver rated with a like (1), a dislike (−1) or did not take any action within
the time limit (0); Mean Like received: Average of the likes received by the players; Mean Dislike received:
Average of the dislikes received by the players; Suggestion request coherence: The Receiver requested the
suggestion when paired with a good rated Observer (+); Acceptance coherence: The Receiver followed the
suggestion received by a good rated Observer (+); Feedback coherence: The Receiver rated positively an
Observer who provided a “good” suggestion and negatively an Observer who gave a “bad” advice (+).
5.2. Manipulation Check
We operationalized fairness as the difference between offers and requests and we asked whether
introducing an evaluation of the Observer, as a proxy for reputation, could affect participants’
behaviors. The answer is yes, and this happened both in the resource exchange part of the game,
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and in the information exchange (i.e., feedback actions). When reputation was on, Donors’ offers
were characterized by a larger positive difference between the donation and the request (Table 4).
To evaluate information sharing, we termed “prosocial” a useful suggestion from the Observer and the
consequent like by the Receiver, and “antisocial” a wrong suggestion. Receivers can be antisocial in
two ways: either they dislike a correct suggestion (thus decreasing the Observer’s reputation), or they
like a wrong one. Figure 1 shows that during the game, and regardless of the presence of reputation
mechanisms, the Observers were prosocial 50.6% of the times. Also, 15.2% of the likes received by
the Observers were justified (i.e., prosocial), showing a cooperative use of this tool. The number of
participants who did not provide an observation was marginal (23.3%), and not too different from
the percentage of those giving antisocial suggestions (26.1%). Subjects did not provide a feedback to
the observer’s reputation in 72.4% of the interactions, while 12.4% of the times Receivers provided
wrong feedbacks (giving a like to an Observer who suggested an unfair deal or the other way around).
Overall, the introduction of reputation changed Donors’ and Receivers’ behaviors, even if only one
player, the Observer, was subject to peers’ evaluation.
Figure 1. Distribution of the informative behaviors for both treatments. Percentage of pro-social and
antisocial feedback for the Observers’ advice and for the Receivers’ feedback.
5.2.1. Hypothesis 1
Table 4 reports the results of the Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) analysis for the
Donor role. Regarding the offers, we found a significant effect of Age and Gender, but also two
interaction effects (i.e., Age*Gender, Condition*Gender). In general, the adolescents offered lower
amounts than the undergraduates. Gender also played a role, with the females offering more than
the males. Interestingly however, the males offered more without the reputation system and adolescent
females appeared to offer less than their adult counterpart. Instead, no gender effects were found
for the Donors’ resource request behaviour, which was affected by Age and Condition. In particular,
the adolescents demanded a larger amount of resources and the overall level of asked resources was
higher when reputation was absent. However, when the reputation system was absent the adolescents
reduced their demands.
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Table 4. GLMM—Donor’s behaviours: Donation and Requested amounts and Fairness of the deals
(CC: Control condition; RT: Reputation treatment; A: Adolescent; U: University Student; M: Male).
General Models
Target Akaike 1 F df(1) df(2) Precision
Donation d 65.002 52.01 ∗∗∗ 5 3151 55.7%
Requested d 66.209 4.11 ∗∗∗ 5 3155 54.3%
Fairness d 65.658 6.63 ∗∗∗ 5 3155 54.0%
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Donation d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (A) 109.5 ∗∗∗ −0.601 −10.64 ∗∗∗
Gender (M) 42.94 ∗∗∗ −0.273 −4.41 ∗∗∗
Age(A)*Gender (M) 28.99 ∗∗∗ 0.639 9.71 ∗∗∗
Condition(CC)*Gender (M) 42.94 ∗∗∗ 0.337 5.38 ∗∗∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Requested d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (A) 3.43 ∗ 0.356 2.32 ∗
Condition (CC) 4.52 ∗∗ 0.526 3.18 ∗∗∗
Condition(CC)*Age (A) 11.46 ∗∗∗ −0.601 −3.38 ∗∗∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Fairness d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (U) 15.97 ∗∗∗ 0.662 4.66 ∗∗∗
Condition (RT) 19.70 ∗∗ 0.670 4.38 ∗∗∗
Condition(RT)*Age (A) 13.32 ∗∗∗ −0.599 −3.65 ∗∗∗
d: Discretized with respect to the median; 1: Correct Akaike coefficient; 2: Standardized coefficient;
∗∗∗: p < 0.001; ∗∗: p < 0.01; ∗: p < 0.05.
Also, the analysis for the fairness of the deals (i.e., difference between the amount offered and the
amount requested in return), did not show any gender effects. The average level of fairness seemed to
be higher in the Reputation Treatment and among young adults. Surprisingly, the adolescents have
sent unfair offers more frequently when the reputation system was present.
5.2.2. Hypothesis 2
To understand whether Receivers’ behaviors changed after the introduction of an evaluation on
Observers, we carried out a Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) analysis. The final models
about the reputation capability to influence the Receiver’s decision making are reported in Table 5.
The decision about asking for a suggestion resulted influenced by the interaction between the
Reputation score and the Age of the participants. The adolescents payed more attention to the
reputation of their partners, avoiding asking untrustworthy Observers. As regards the use of the
reputational information to decide about the Donor’s deals (i.e., coherence of acceptance) we observed
different patterns of compliance. Our participants relied on their partners’ reputation more often if this
was positive, whereas when interacting with an illreputed Observer our participants trusted his/her
suggestions significantly less. Finally, the tendency to leave a feedback resulted influenced by the
Reputation level and by Gender. Observer with an ambiguous reputation were less frequently being
evaluated. Furthermore, the males showed themselves more inclined to feedback their partner.
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Table 5. Reputation (i.e., number of Like—number of Dislikes) influence final model. Suggestion
required (Requested), Coherence on Acceptance (Coh. Acc.), Feedback (Feedback), Suggestion
Followed (Followed) (0: Ambiguous reputation; -: Negative reputation; A: Adolescents; M: Male).
General Models
Target Akaike 1 F df(1) df(2) Precision
Requested d 47.359 12.99 ∗∗∗ 5 1598 58.3%
Coh. Acc. d 14.985 29.18 ∗∗∗ 1 473 77.1%
Feedback d 40.708 19.53 ∗∗∗ 3 798 60.6%
Followed d 22.580 14.66 ∗∗∗ 2 619 71.1%
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Requested d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Reputation (0)*Age (A) 7.83 ∗∗∗ −1.036 −4.36 ∗∗∗
Reputation (-)*Age (A) 7.45 ∗∗∗ −0.360 −1.85 ∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Coh. Acc. d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Reputation (-) 29.18 ∗∗∗ −1.258 −5.40 ∗∗∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Feedback d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Reputation (0) 22.13 ∗∗∗ −0.848 −5.41 ∗∗∗
Gender (M) 13.82 ∗∗∗ 0.432 7.72 ∗∗∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Followed d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Reputation (0) 14.66 ∗∗∗ −1.064 −4.35 ∗∗∗
Reputation (-) 14.66 ∗∗∗ −1.039 −4.94 ∗∗∗
d : Discretized with respect to the median; 1: Correct Akaike coefficient; 2: Standardized coefficient;
∗∗∗: p < 0.001; ∗∗: p < 0.01; ∗: p < 0.05.
5.2.3. Hypotheses 3 and 4
To test the effects of age and gender in relation to reputation management and usage we carried out
new GLMM analyses. Obviously, such analyzes considered only the game sessions in the Reputation
Treatment condition. The results are presented in Table 6.
Deciding whether to ask for a suggestion appeared influenced by the interaction between the
reputation level of the Observer and the Age. The adolescents preferred not to ask Observers with a
bad or an ambiguous (e.g., number of Like-number of Dislikes = 0) reputation, but were less inclined to
provide a dislike to Observer who had already several, irrespective of their direct experience. Indeed,
the adolescents tended to refrain from providing a feedback to Observers who already had a bad or an
ambiguous level of reputation.
To take into account the effect of gender differences within and between the two samples
and among the two conditions (i.e., Reputation Treatment and Control Condition), we run a set
of GLMM. However, for those behaviours present only in the Reputation Treatment (i.e., Reputation
level, Acceptance Coherence, Feedback) the GLMM considered only Gender, Age and their possible
interaction effects as predictors.
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Table 6. GLMM—Reputation (i.e., number of Like—number of Dislikes) and Age influence upon
Suggestion request and Feedback behaviours (0: Ambiguous reputation; -: Negative reputation;
A: Adolescents).
General Models
Target Akaike 1 F df(1) df(2) Precision
Requested d 47.359 12.99 ∗∗∗ 5 1598 58.3%
Feedback d 45.874 18.60 ∗∗∗ 5 1598 72.4%
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Requested d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Reputation (0)*Age (A) 7.83 ∗∗∗ −1.036 −4.36 ∗∗∗
Reputation (-)*Age (A) 7.5 ∗∗∗ −0.360 −1.85 ∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Feedback d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Reputation (-) 19.33 ∗ 0.407 1.95 ∗
Age (A)*Reputation (-) 4.52 ∗∗∗ −0.386 1.95 ∗
Age (A)*Reputation (0) 4.52 ∗∗∗ −0.929 −3.12 ∗∗∗
d: Discretized with respect to the median; 1: Correct Akaike coefficient; 2: Standardized coefficient;
∗∗∗: p < 0.001; ∗∗:p < 0.01; ∗: p < 0.05.
The average level of reputation obtained by the Observers within the Reputation Treatment
condition resulted to be affected directly by both Gender and Age and no interaction effects were found.
The adolescents achieved a lower level of reputation while the females succeeded to obtain a higher
reputation degree compared to the males (Table 7).
Table 7. GLMM—Observer’s behaviour: Reputation (i.e., number of Like—number of Dislikes)
(A: Adolescent; M: Male).
General Models
Target Akaike 1 F df(1) df(2) Precision
Reputation d 33.184 52.01 ∗∗∗ 2 1600 65.0%
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Reputation d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (A) 76.41 ∗∗∗ −1.126 −7.29 ∗∗∗
Gender (M) 4.56 ∗ −0.398 −2.26 ∗
d: Discretized with respect to the median; 1: Correct Akaike coefficient; 2: Standardized coefficient;
∗∗∗: p < 0.001; ∗∗: p < 0.01; ∗:p < 0.05.
Participants’ gender and age affected the Receivers’ search for information (Table 8), with the
adolescents and the females less likely to ask Observers for suggestions. The tendency to trust the
suggestion (i.e., decide to accept the deal if the Observers suggest to the Receivers to accept it and
to refuse the Donors’ offer if the hint received was to decline it) was also connected to Gender
(both directly than by the interaction Gender*Condition) and Age: the adolescents trusted (called
“Suggestion Followed”) the Observer’s suggestions less frequently while the females seemed to be
more sensitive about the suggestion. Furthermore, when reputation was not present the males trusted
the Observer’s information even less.
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Table 8. GLMM—Receivers’ behaviours: Suggestion required (Requested), Coherence on acceptance
(Cohe. Acc.), Feedback (Feedback), Suggestion Followed (Followed) (A: Adolescent; M: Male; CC:
Control condition).
General Models
Target Akaike 1 F df(1) df(2) Precision
Requested d 36.12 25.70 ∗∗∗ 2 3158 57.4%
Coh. Acc. d 33.161 2.64 ∗ 1 1455 52.9%
Feedback d 32.647 9.82 ∗∗∗ 2 1598 72.4%
Followed d 59.884 32.48 ∗∗∗ 5 1653 57.6%
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Requested d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (A) 52.32 ∗∗∗ −0.664 −6.15 ∗∗∗
Gender (M) 20.41 ∗∗∗ 0.245 1.98 ∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Coh. Acc. d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (A) 6.63 ∗∗ −0.376 −2.41 ∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Feedback d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (A) 11.50 ∗∗∗ −0.226 −1.97 ∗
Gender (M) 17.99 ∗∗ 0.676 3.59 ∗∗∗
Fixed Effects and Parameters-Followed d
Parameter F B 2 Student t
Age (A) 40.02 ∗∗∗ −0.237 −3.62 ∗∗∗
Gender (M) 95.28 ∗∗∗ −0.264 −3.87 ∗∗∗
Condition (CC)*Gender (M) 17.25 ∗∗∗ −0.297 −4.15 ∗∗∗
d: Discretized with respect to the median; 1: Correct Akaike coefficient; 2: Standardized coefficient;
∗∗∗: p < 0.001; ∗∗: p < 0.01; ∗: p < 0.05.
Nevertheless, trust in the reputation of the Observer to decide whether to accept or decline the
offers (called “Acceptance Coherence”) did not result connected to Gender and only seemed to vary as
a function of Age. The adolescents appeared to rely less on the Observer’s reputation when deciding
about the Donor’s deal. Receivers could also leave feedbacks about Observers’ trustworthiness,
deciding between no feedback, a positive one and a negative one. The males were more inclined to
feedback the Observer with which they had interact compared to the females, while the adolescents
were less prone to leave a feedback.
6. Discussion
When individuals experience “deindividuation” in an anonymous virtual group interaction,
they rely more on reputation to orientate their own behaviors. Under such a psychological state,
reputation appears to exert a greater social influence. In this sense, reputation seems able to promote
pro-social behaviors (i.e., fairness), as well as to discriminate between social partners, exerting
more trust-related behaviours (i.e., suggestion request, suggestion following) towards good-rated
individuals. Differently from previous works on Prisoner’s Dilemma, in our game reputation levels
(i.e., high, low and ambiguous) were treated differently by participants for orienting their choices [19].
Overall, our work contributes to the literature on the role of reputation in supporting fairness
and trust-related behaviors by showing that reputational dynamics have a broad impact, changing
individuals’ behaviors both directly and indirectly. Furthermore, some trends seem to suggest that
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adolescents and undergraduates could have and rely on different behavioral patterns with regard to
reputational concerns and usage.
Even in a competitive environment in which information can be strategically manipulated in
order to increase one’s scores, we observed a predominance of reliable suggestions from Observers,
with and without reputational opportunities.
As pointed out by previous research, Donors in a social dilemma situation appear to be very
sensitive to some game-related features and adjust their behaviour consequentially [40,41]. In our case,
even if the Donors were not identified by any reputational score, they adjusted their behaviour when
facing a virtual environment characterized by reputational mechanisms. Indeed, we observed how the
Donors raised the amount of resources offered while they decrease their demands, thus increasing the
fairness of the proposed deals.
Furthermore, the level of the acquired reputation (i.e., positive, negative, ambiguous) influenced
the level of trust related behaviours shown by Receivers. Reliable partners were more often required
for a suggestion and their prescriptions were more frequently followed. While generally, Observers
with an ambiguous or a negative reputation had less influence on the Receivers’ decisions.
Moreover, the reputation capability to exert an influence on trust behaviours within an anonymous
virtual group, appeared almost entirely disconnected from gender, age and psychological features.
This phenomenon could be account by the psychological state of “de-individuation” [42]. Indeed,
the anonymity and the physical isolation of our virtual setting could have triggered such a state,
and thus induced subjects to rely less on their individual characteristics, and more onto the set of local
norms (i.e., reputation) to adjust their behaviour.
One striking aspect of our results is that reputational concerns worked even indirectly, through
players’ expectations. Donors became more generous because they expected Observers to be more
reliable in the Reputation Treatment, even if Observers were not aware of their reputation and could
not strategically increase or decrease it. This is a very interesting result which adds to the fairness
literature on the effects of reputational concerns. When playing as Observers, participants did not care
about their reputation, probably because they had no access to this information.
Although in the last few years the importance of reputation in supporting fairness and trust has
been widely acknowledged (see [5,43] for two recently published reviews on the topic), the importance
of individual factors, like age and gender, in reputation-mediated social interactions deserves more
attention. The ontogeny of fairness and trust has received growing attention in recent years [44,45],
and reputation management abilities appear relatively early in ontogeny [46], but less is known
about the transition from adolescence into adulthood. During this period, two elements become
characteristics in adolescents’ behavior: the susceptibility to peer influence and the sensitivity to
peer rejection, both mediated by reputation. Social approval and positive reputation might affect
the development of self-processes, and perceived support from others can protect adolescents from
stress and anxiety [47]. A growing body of research shows the existence of a link between reputation
management and delinquency in adolescence [48], with adolescents actively engaging in the acquisition
of a non-conforming social reputation. The search for social approval could explain why adolescents
became unfairer when playing as Donors in the Reputation Treatment, but it could also explain why
they were cautious with reputational information. Reputation is a safeguard against ostracism [49]
but it also functions as a way of attaining higher status within the peer’s group [48]. Adolescent
behavior is motivated by social goals and purposeful reputation-enhancing strategies [50], because
acquiring a reputation has also implications for how an adolescent regards herself. In such a context,
adolescents in our game paid more attention to their partners’ reputations, consistently avoiding
asking untrustworthy Observers, but they also achieved a lower level of reputation overall. Our results
highlight the importance of reputation and status during adolescence, showing that these concerns
orient individuals’ behaviors also in the lab. Further research is needed to understand the extent to
which age interacts with the environment (competitive and cooperative), or with self-presentation
issues which were ruled out by anonymity in the lab.
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Another promising direction of research is on gender differences in fairness and trust-related
behaviors, as in our study. The evidence on the topic is inconclusive, partially because different kinds
of social preferences can explain it. Some studies suggested that women are more prosocial than men
(e.g., [51,52]), but in a review paper by Croson and Gneezy [53] the inconsistencies between studies
reporting opposite effects, or even no gender effects are revealed. The emergence of gender differences
in social dilemmas could be mediated by a set of contextual factors [54], like mixed-sex vs. same sex
dilemmas. Recent works reignited the debate by suggesting that women are more altruistic than men
in the Dictator game [55,56]. Women are expected to behave more pro-socially than men and this may
drive their allocation behavior. Nevertheless, in our work no gender effect was detected regarding
fairness. In our study, women were more inclined to follow the Observers’ suggestions, thus showing
higher levels of trust (i.e., following actions). However, such behaviour of women could be differently
interpreted, for example, by a lack of self-confidence or a greater tendency to pay more attention to
the others’ suggestions culturally promoted. Interestingly, women seemed to show better reputation
management skills, gaining a more positive reputation during the game, even if previous research
had reported different results [34]. In any case, the effect of gender does not seem to be too strong in
ours experiments.
To conclude, our results illustrate that reputational concerns may promote pro-social choices even
indirectly, and in ambiguous and noisy (i.e., virtual) environments, but also that fairness and trust are
mediated within virtual environments and social dilemmas games by reputation. As in Shakespeare’s
words: Reputation, reputation, reputation! Oh, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of
myself, and what remains is bestial. My reputation, Iago, my reputation!
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